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Abstract – Biometric recognition offers a reliable
and natural solution to the problem of user authenti-
cation by means of her physical and behavioral traits.
An iris template protection scheme which associates
and retrieves a secret value with a high level of
security, is proposed. The security is guaranteed thanks
to the requirements of fuzzy extractors. The implemen-
tation of the scheme is done in Java and experimental
results are performed to calculate its False Acceptance
Rate and its False Rejection Rate.
Keywords: Cancelable biometrics, Fuzzy extractor,
Fuzzy vault, Intra- and inter-user variability, Lagrange
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1. Introduction
In today’s society the problem of securing informa-
tion and ensuring privacy is a growing concern.
Traditionally, Cryptography is used in order to en-
sure the secrecy and the authenticity of information
by means of different techniques and algorithms (cryp-
tosystems). In cryptosystems one or more keys are used
to transform the plaintext into a ciphertext. Without the
knowledge of the correct decrypting key, the conver-
sion of ciphertext into the plaintext is infeasible.
Although most of the cryptosystems currently used,
such as AES, RSA, ECC, etc. ([13], [18]), have proven
its security, some of them suffer from the key manage-
ment problem. It is known that the security of these
cryptosystems relies on the assumption that the keys
are kept in secret for everybody but the reliable users.
If the secret key, for the symmetric cryptosystems, or
the private key, for the asymmetric ones, is compro-
mised, the security is completely broken.
Another problem is related to the bitlength of the
keys used. As the keys used are large (128-256 bits for
symmetric cryptosystems and 1024-2048 for the asym-
metric ones), it is impossible to be memorized. Thus,
the keys are, in general, stored in a “secure” location
such as computers, smart cards, etc., and kept in secret
by a password-based authentication mechanism. The
drawback of these mechanisms is that passwords can
be easily stolen, forgotten or guessed using different
attacks, such as brute force attacks. Consequently, a
plaintext protected by means of a cryptosystem is as
secure as the password used to release the key. Besides,
the use of passwords does not provide non-repudiation.
Some of these limitations and weaknesses can be
suppressed by the incorporation of better new methods
of user authentication. Biometric authentication ([7],
[12]) consists of verifying individuals based on their
physiological and behavioral traits such as face, finger-
print, hand geometry, iris, voice, handwritten signature,
and so on. Biometric systems offer obvious advantages
over other authentication systems. They are inherently
more reliable than password-based authentication, as
biometric characteristics cannot be lost or forgotten.
Moreover, biometric traits are extremely difficult to
copy, forge, share, and distribute, and it is unlikely for a
user to repudiate having accessed a particular content
using Biometrics. Finally all the users have equality
security level. Thus, Biometrics-based authentication
can be used instead of password-based authentication.
In this work, a new biometric template protection
scheme based on iris templates is proposed. This
scheme permits to associate and retrieve a secret value
with a high level of security. The scheme allows
the authentication of a user using her own biometric
template as a key. The implementation of the scheme
has been developed in Java, and experiments have been
performed to demonstrate its efficiency.
The rest of this work is organized as follows:
In Section II, the biometric systems are described
identifying their vulnerabilities. Section III shows the
main template protection schemes and the way they
provide security for the biometric templates. Then, the
main characteristics of fuzzy vault and fuzzy extractor
schemes are commented in section IV. In section V our
proposal for a biometric fuzzy extractor scheme for iris
templates is presented, explaining the enrollment and
the verifications phases. Finally, the main conclusions
and some future works are presented in section VI.
2. Biometric systems
2.1. Description, Vulnerabilities and Security
A generic biometric system consists of five com-
ponents: Sensor, feature extractor, template database,
matcher, and decision module ([8]). Fig. 1 shows a
basic block diagram of a biometric system ([21]).
Figure 1: Basic block diagram of a biometric system.
In general, these systems run as follows: In the en-
rollment phase, the biometric templates are processed
and stored in the database. Then, in the verification
phase, the biometric query template extracted from the
user in this moment is compared with the one already
stored in the database. If this comparison succeeds the
user identity is verified, otherwise she is rejected.
In most cases, the applications in which biometric
systems are used are unimodal, i.e., they rely on the
evidence of a single source of information for authen-
tication. But these systems suffer from some prob-
lems, among them the most important are the intra-
and inter-user variability. The intra-user variability
measures the differences of two biometric templates
extracted from the same user, while the inter-user vari-
ability measures the similarities between two biometric
templates extracted from different users. These two
measurements can cause not to recognize a known
user or to recognize an attacker as a known user,
respectively.
Some of the limitations in the use of unimodal
biometric systems can be solved by including multiple
sources of information, i.e., different biometric traits.
Such systems are known as multimodal biometric
systems ([16], [17]).
The most straightforward way to secure a biometric
system, including the template, is to put all the system
modules and the interfaces between them on a smart
card. These systems are known as match-on-card and
their advantage is that the biometric information never
leaves the card. The drawback is that these systems
are not appropriate for large-scale applications and it
is possible to get the template from a stolen card. So,
both the system and the template must be protected.
One desirable characteristic that the biometric tem-
plates should have is to be revoked or canceled if
necessary, as PIN and passwords do.
3. Cancelable Biometrics: Template Pro-
tection Schemes
Several approaches, known as cancelable biomet-
rics, have been proposed to secure biometric templates.
Cancelable biometrics, proposed for the first time by
Ratha et al. ([15]), refers to a way to inherit the
protection and the replacement characteristics into bio-
metrics. Essentially, cancelable biometrics performs a
distortion of the biometric templates before matching.
The variability in the distortion parameters provides
the existence of different schemes.
The major challenge in the biometric template pro-
tection is the intra-user variability and, as it was
explained, this is the reason of why standard protection
cryptographic schemes cannot be applied into Biomet-
rics. As the templates are not stable, a small difference
in the template would lead to very large differences in
the encrypted domain.
There are mainly two categories of template protec-
tion schemes ([8]): Feature transformation approach
and Biometric cryptosystem (see Fig. 2).
Figure 2: Template protection schemes.
In the feature transformation approach, a transfor-
mation function is applied to the biometric template
and then it is store in the database. The function used
can be invertible (salting) or non-invertible.
On the other hand, the basic idea for the biomet-
ric cryptosystems ([19]) is either binding the crypto-
graphic key with the biometric templates or generating
the key directly from the template. Therefore, biomet-
ric cryptosystems can be classified into two models:
Key binding, and Key generation.
The common characteristic of these two models is
that they need to generate public information, known
as helper data, about the biometric template in order to
perform the verification phase. This public information
is supposed to reveal no important information about
the biometric template.
4. Fuzzy vault and fuzzy extractor schemes
Biometric reference data storage must be avoided as
much as possible, because if the biometric templates
are compromised or stolen, there is no way to cancel
or revoke them.
The first biometric system was proposed by Juels
and Wattenberg in [10]. Their method is called Fuzzy
commitment because a cryptographic key is decom-
mitted using biometric data. In this context, fuzziness
means that a value close to the original is sufficient
to extract the committed value. This scheme although
compensates the intra-user variability of biometric
data, has some shortcomings because it makes assump-
tions which are not applicable in real life.
4.1. Fuzzy vault scheme
Juels and Sudan ([9]) proposed the use of Fuzzy
vault schemes, which can be considered as an order-
invariant version of the fuzzy commitment schemes.
They are obtained by using a Reed-Solomon code in
which they evaluate the codeword by means of a poly-
nomial over a set of points. In this case, the process
is to encode the secret data as a polynomial, p(x),
of degree d, by using the Reed-Solomon encoding
scheme. That is, the secret message is embedded as the
coefficients of the polynomial. Next, the polynomial is
evaluated for different values of a set of features of the
biometric data,B= {b0, . . . ,bn−1}.
Then, a genuine set of pairs of points are produced:
G = {(b0, p(b0)), . . . ,(bn−1, p(bn−1))},
where n refers to the size of the unordered set B on
p(x). Moreover, a set of chaff points, N, which do no
verify the polynomial p(x), are generated in order to
protect G. The value of the vault, V , i.e., the encoded
message, consists of the set union V = G∪N.
To decode the message a unordered set B¯ is needed
and if it is close to the set B, the genuine set of points
G can be discriminated from V . Note that the user
needs d+1 pairs of points (bi, p(bi))∈G to recover the
original polynomial by using Lagrange interpolation.
A practical implementation of the fuzzy vault in a
secure smart-card is proposed in [2].
In [14] it is showed that hardening the fuzzy vault
scheme with a password enhances its security provid-
ing it with privacy-enhancing features such as revo-
cability and protection against cross-matching across
different biometric systems.
There are fuzzy vault implementations based on
other traits different from fingerprints, such as face
([5]) and hand-written signature ([6]). Moreover, two
important schemes based on the key binding model
are proposed (see [11], [20]). The first scheme uses
the fuzzy vault scheme to bind a secret with iris
images, while the second one proposes a fuzzy ex-
tractor, according to the definitions of Dodis et al.
([4]), to associate, and retrieve, a committed value
using a special fingerprint data representation called
FingerCode.
Fuzzy vault schemes present some limitations:
1) If the same biometric data is used to construct
different vaults with different polynomial and different
chaff points, the genuine points can be easily identified
by correlating the abscissa values from these different
fuzzy vaults from different systems.
2) The set of chaff points is bigger than the set of
genuine points and it is possible to substitute some
points of this chaff-point set for the features of a
possible attacker. In this way the attacker and the
original user could be correctly identified with the
same fuzzy vault.
3) The non-uniformity of the biometric features
makes possible to identify the genuine set from the set
of chaff points by using a statistical analysis. Chang
and Li have analyzed this problem ([1])
4.2. Fuzzy extractor scheme
A Fuzzy extractor scheme is a biometric tool whose
purpose is to authenticate a user using her own biomet-
ric template as a key. It works extracting a uniformly
random string S from its input B, which is a biometric
template, in a noise-tolerant way. That means that if
the input changes to some B¯ but remains close, the
string S can still be reproduced exactly. To help in the
reproduction of S, the first time the fuzzy extractor
is used, i.e., in the enrollment phase, it outputs a
helper string H that can safely be made public without
decreasing the security of S.
The role of each variable is the following: S would
be the encryption or authentication key and H would be
the public data stored in the database whose function
is to recover S. The user’s biometric template acts as
the key to recover S.
The fuzzy extractor process can be explained as
a pair of efficient randomized procedures: Generate
(Gen) and Reproduce (Rep). In the enrollment phase,
given B, the procedure Gen outputs an extracted string
S ∈ {0,1} and a helper string H ∈ {0,1}. In the
verification phase, Rep takes as input an element B¯,
close to B, and the string H ∈ {0,1}, and outputs
the value S. The correctness of the whole procedure
depends on the differences between B and B¯.
A basic tool needed in the development of fuzzy
extractor is the secure sketch. It allows the precise re-
construction of a noisy input. On input B a procedure
outputs a sketch c. Then, given c and a value B¯ close
to B, it is possible to recover B. The sketch is secure
in the sense that it does not reveal much information
about B even if c is known. Thus, it is possible to
store c.
In the same way, secure sketch can de explained
as a pair of efficient randomized procedures: Sketch
(Sket) and Recover (Rec). The sketching procedure,
Sket, starts with the sketch, B, as input and returns
a string c ∈ {0,1}∗. The recovery procedure Rec takes
an element B¯ and c ∈ {0,1}∗ and returns the corre-
sponding value B. The correctness is again depending
on the distance between B and B¯.
5. A biometric fuzzy extractor scheme
for iris templates
The proposed fuzzy extractor scheme can be divided
into two well-defined phases: The enrollment phase
and the verification phase. In the enrollment phase,
the users’ iris templates are processed and the public
data are calculated and stored in the database. On the
other hand, in the verification phase the identity of the
user is verified to knowif she is really who she says
to be. This phase is performed comparing the current
user’s template, called the query template, with the
data stored in the database. If they match, the process
continues, otherwise an error is displayed.
5.1. Enrollment phase
The enrollment phase (see Fig. 3) consists of obtain-
ing specific public data from the user’s Iris Template
and from a Secret (or key) which she has previously
selected. These public data, denoted as the sets ∆ and
H, are stored in the database.
Figure 3: Enrollment phase.
The enrollment phase consists of the following: 1)
The secret or the key, S, is represented in a determined
base (base 10, 16, 256, 512, etc.).
From the expression of S in such base, the coef-
ficients of a polynomial p(x) of degree d, will be
derived. So, the relationship between S and p(x) is
direct. For example, if S is written in the base 512= 29,
each digit of S in this base can be represented as an
integer between 0 and 511. Therefore, the coefficients
of p(x) will be numbers in the interval [0,511]. In this
way, if S = {s0,s1, . . . ,sd}, then:
p(x) = s0+ s1x+ s2x2+ . . .+ sdxd . (1)
2) Next, n random points verifying p(x) are calcu-
lated, yi = p(xi), 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1. The value of n is a
security parameter which controls the fuzziness of the
templates allowed in the scheme. For this reason, n
must be much greater than d (n d).
3) The coordinates of the n points, (xi,yi) are
concatenated, xi ‖ yi, and encoded as n codewords by
means of a Reed-Solomon code to form the set C:
C = {c0,c1, . . . ,cn−1}. Then, a hash function, h, is
applied to the set C and a set of n hash values, H,
is obtained:
H = {h(c0),h(c1), . . . ,h(cn−1)}.
In the proposed scheme, it is possible to use any of
the usual hash functions, such as SHA-1, SHA-2, etc.
4) Now, the template of each user is necessary to
calculate the set ∆. Each iris template, B, is divided
into n parts, as many as points were computed:
B= b0 ‖ b1 ‖ . . . ‖ bn−1
Each value bi, 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, is subtracted from each
codeword of the set C, to obtain the elements of the
set ∆= {δ0,δ1, . . . ,δn−1}, where
δi = ci−bi, 0≤ i≤ n−1.
Both sets, ∆ and H, are stored in the database.
Moreover, the control parameters have to be stored
because they will be necessary in the verification
phase. They are:
• The degree of the polynomial, d.
• The Reed-Solomon parameters: k, nRS, and m.
• The hash function used, digest.
• The base in which S is represented.
The value of n can be obtained directly from the
cardinal of ∆.
5.2. Verification phase
This phase consists of the verification of a user
(Fig. 4) by means of her query iris template. If the
verification succeeds, her secret will be retrieved; oth-
erwise an error is displayed. The process is as follows:
Figure 4: Verification phase.
1) All the control parameters are obtained.
2) The query iris template, B¯, is divided into n parts:
B¯= b¯0 ‖ b¯1 ‖ . . . ‖ b¯n−1
3) Next, from the values of the elements in ∆ and
B¯, a new set of values, C¯ is computed:
C¯ = {c¯0, c¯1, . . . , c¯n−1}.
Each element, c¯i = δi+ b¯i, are supposed to be quite
similar to the values of the set C calculated in the
enrollment phase, but taking into account the influence
of the intra-user variability.
4) After applying the same hash function as in
the enrollment phase to the elements in C¯, they are
compared with the corresponding elements in H.
In this comparison, it is necessary that at least d+1
values of H and h(C¯) coincide. If it happens, the query
iris template is considered as valid and the process to
retrieve S continues. Otherwise, the recovery process
leads to an error. This error is due because at least d+1
points are needed to recover a polynomial of degree d
by the Lagrange interpolation.
The importance of the value n is shown in this
moment. Due to the intra-user variability and as d+1
correct values are necessary, the value of n is a measure
of the degree of fuzziness allowed by the scheme.
5) The coincident values are decoded by means of
the Reed-Solomon code and, at least, d + 1 points
(xi,yi) are obtained.
6) The next step is to use the Lagrange interpolation
method to obtain the coefficients of p(x).
7) Finally, S can be easily retrieved by means of the
coefficients of p(x) and the base it was represented in.
6. Experimental results
The aim of the experiments performed with the
scheme proposed is to measure how it deals with the
intra-user and inter-user variability. To do this task, 25
users from the CASIA database of iris images have
been chosen randomly. Each one of these users have
7 different images of their irises and by using the
algorithm designed by Diez Laiz ([3]) the correspond-
ing templates of all these 25 · 7 = 175 images have
been extracted. Finally, the results obtained are used
to calculate the rates of false reject, FRR, and false
acceptance, FAR.
Before performing the experiments, a first analysis
of the characteristics of the templates of these users
shows that the mean of the Hamming distance of each
user is around 33.3%.
All the 25 ·7 = 175 templates are enrolled and their
public data, ∆ and H, are calculated and stored. The
basic idea of the experiments is to count the number
of coincidences between the set H and the set formed
by the hash values of the set C¯, h(C¯).
The parameters considered in the experiment are the
following: S is a secret of 192 bits, i.e, it can be a secret
key for 3-DES or AES. S is represented in base= 512,
the degree of the polynomial is d = 21, and n = 384.
The hash function considered is digest = SHA-512, and
the parameters for the Reed-Solomon code are: k= 23,
nRS = 36, and m = 9.
6.1. Intra-user variability measure: FRR
This experiment is carried out in the following
way: Each one of the 7 templates of the 25 users
is considered as the input of the verification phase
and it is compared with the data stored, H, of the
rest of the templates of the same user. In this way,
the result of these comparisons will show the level of
similarity between all the templates of a single user
(intra-user variability). These coincidences determines
whether the secret can be retrieved or not. In our case,
if there are at least d + 1 = 22 coincidences between
two different templates, the user is recognized and her
secret is retrieved. The results of this experiment are
used to measure the False Rejection Rate. This rate is
not a secure parameter, but it is a comfort criteria.
Table 1 shows the number of comparisons with, at
least, d + 1 = 22 coincidences for each one of the
25 users compared to herself. The total number of
comparisons done, in each user, is
(7
2
)
= 21.
From these values, the False Rejection Rate (FRR)
of the scheme can be computed. To do this, the
Table 1: Number of comparisons with, at least, 22
coincidences for the 25 users.
User 1 User 2 User 3 User 4 User 5
> d = 21 21 20 21 20 21
User 6 User 7 User 8 User 9 User 10
> d = 21 19 19 14 18 21
User 11 User 12 User 13 User 14 User 15
> d = 21 13 19 15 19 20
User 16 User 17 User 18 User 19 User 20
> d = 21 18 21 21 16 15
User 21 User 22 User 23 User 24 User 25
> d = 21 20 21 18 17 20
Genuine Acceptance Rate (GAR) is calculated:
GAR =
467
21 ·25 = 0.88952' 88.9%
and then
FRR = 1−GAR = 1−0.88952 = 0.11048' 11%.
This percentage is quite good because 89% is a high
rate of recognition.
6.2. Inter-user variability measure: FAR
This experiment measures the similarities between
different users (inter-user variability). It is divided
into two sub-experiments. For both sub-experiments,
instead of using the 7 templates of each of the 25 users,
only one template of each user is chosen randomly and
these 25 templates (1 from each user) will be used.
6.2.1. Templates vs. Database. The first sub-
experiment measures the similarities of the 25 tem-
plates selected with the whole database formed by the
25 users. The total number of comparisons done is
7 ·24= 168 for each of the 25 templates. Table 2 shows
the number of comparisons among the 25 templates
and the 25 users with, at least, d+1= 22 coincidences.
Table 2: Number of comparisons among the 25 tem-
plates and the 25 users with, at least, 22 coincidences.
Tpl. 1 Tpl. 2 Tpl. 3 Tpl. 4 Tpl. 5
> d = 21 0 2 2 0 0
Tpl. 6 Tpl. 7 Tpl. 8 Tpl. 9 Tpl. 10
> d = 21 2 4 0 0 1
Tpl. 11 Tpl. 12 Tpl. 13 Tpl. 14 Tpl. 15
> d = 21 0 1 2 2 6
Tpl. 16 Tpl. 17 Tpl. 18 Tpl. 19 Tpl. 20
> d = 21 7 4 8 0 0
Tpl. 21 Tpl. 22 Tpl. 23 Tpl. 24 Tpl. 25
> d = 21 0 9 1 2 4
The results shown in Table 2 are used to measure
the False Acceptance Rate (FAR1) as this rate indicates
if the secret of the original user is retrieved to a person
who is not really the original user. This ratio is critical
because it is a security relevant measure since the
system recognizes an attacker as a known user.
FAR1 =
57
7 ·24 ·25 = 0.01357' 1.35%.
This value is not excellent, but it can be acceptable
for some applications.
6.2.2. Templates vs. Templates. The second sub-
experiment consists of comparing the 25 templates
chosen among themselves. This sub-experiment mea-
sures a more specific False Acceptance Rate (FAR2).
The total number of comparisons in this occasion
is
(25
2
)
= 300. Only 2 of all these comparisons were
≥ d+1 = 22, thus:
FAR2 =
2
300
= 0.00667' 0.67%,
which is a good value and it is closer to a real situation
with a real biometric system.
7. Conclusions and future work
The conclusions of this work are divided in two
parts: Those related with the limitations of the fuzzy
vault schemes (see §4.1), and those related with the two
main problems of the biometric systems: the secure
storage of the biometric template and the intra- and
inter-user variability.
1) The first limitation of the fuzzy vault scheme is
not longer a problem with our scheme because the
biometric data is not used in the creation of the poly-
nomial. Each time the process is executed a different
set of random points, x- and y-coordinates, is created.
Thus, it is not feasible a cross-matching of templates
among different vaults from different systems.
2) Another limitation solved with our scheme is the
possible identification of two people with the same
vault due to the set of chaff points. In our scheme,
as the points (xi,yi) are chosen randomly, there is no
option to insert the biometric template of an attacker.
The attacker can use her template trying to obtain the
set C¯, but at this point the hash function assures the
security of the system against this attack.
3) In our scheme the third limitation is avoided
because only the random-generated values are used in
the polynomial.
In relation to the problems of secure storage of
the biometric template, our scheme fits with the four
main characteristic that a biometric template protection
scheme should have, namely: 1) Diversity. Cross-
matching between databases are not feasible with our
scheme since the points and the secret are generated
randomly every time. The user’s privacy is assured.
2) Revocability. If an iris template is compromised,
it can be changed for a new one based on the same
biometric trait. In our scheme, as the iris templates are
not stored directly anywhere they cannot be stolen or
compromised.
3) Security. It is computationally hard to obtain the
original iris template from the secure template thanks
to the use of hash functions.
3) Performance. The recognition performance (FAR
and FRR) of the system is not degraded.
And related to the intra- and inter-user variability:
1) The results obtained in the second experiment of
inter-user variability shows (see §6.2) two values of
False Acceptance Rate (FAR). Firstly comparing a sin-
gle iris template of each user with the whole database
has a FAR1 ' 1,3%; and secondly comparing only the
25 templates selected at random has a FAR2 ' 0.67%.
The big difference between these two values, FAR1
' 2· FAR2, proves that the intra-user variability is
very high (recall that the mean of Hamming distances
between the templates of the same user is around
33.3%).
2) The results of the first experiment performed
show that the False Rejection Rate (FRR) has a per-
centage of ' 11% (see §6.1). In other words, the
Genuine Acceptance Rate is GAR= 1−FRR = 89%.
To sum up, our scheme has a good behavior related
to the intra- and inter-user variability since it is capable
of recognizing users with a high percentage, 89%,
although their intra-user variability is a bit high, FAR1
' 1,3% versus FAR2 ' 0.67%.
Some of future works are the following:
• Use a cryptographic frame to protect the biometric
template until it is inserted in the system.
• Improve the iris template extraction to reduce the
intra-user variability.
• Implement the scheme in a more efficiency way
to allow using secrets with a bigger bitlength.
• Extend the experiments to the whole CASIA
database or even others databases.
• Use different template extraction algorithms.
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